Measuring efficiency consistent with maximising net benefit

By Simon Eckermann
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Abstract

Conventional methods of specifying effects or quality of service variables in economic efficiency measures as outputs framed from a utility bearing perspective reflect underlying economic objectives such as minimising average cost per unit of effect. However, in service industries such as health care where effects of services are incremental and non-tradable once received, an economic objective of minimising average cost per unit effect has been rejected in favour of maximising (incremental) net benefit. More generally, the maximisation of net benefit, which explicitly values effects at the willingness to pay threshold, has previously been shown to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for pareto improvement with public expenditure under uncertainty.

In this paper a correspondence method is identified which allows the incorporation of effects in ratio measures of efficiency consistent with the maximisation of net benefit. Framing effects from a disutility perspective and comparing service providers on the cost-disutility plane, with an input specification of effects is demonstrated to allow identification of peers and measures of economic, technical, allocative and scale efficiency consistent with maximising net benefit. This method is illustrated in comparing the relative efficiency of 45 hospitals in New South Wales.
Explicit coverage and comparability conditions of the net benefit correspondence theorem underlying this method are also shown to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency measures to avoid the inclusion of cream-skimming and cost-shifting. Hence, efficiency measurement should be qualified as including and creating incentives for cost-shifting and cream skimming where these conditions are not satisfied. Consequently, the proposed method is suggested to provide a robust framework to measure efficiency consistent with maximising net benefit and avoid cost-shifting and cream-skimming incentives. Natural applications are suggested in allowing for value of effects in efficiency measurement for service industries such as health, education and corrective services and allowing for the value of pollution abatement in industries such as energy generation.

Keywords: efficiency measurement; quality of services; maximizing net benefit; cost-shifting; cream-skimming.

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1. Introduction

In public services such as hospitals, costs of services across providers are increasingly compared in countries such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Parallel to this, the effects of services, such as mortality, morbidity and readmission in hospitals, are also increasingly being collected in countries including Australia, Canada and the UK (Australian Council on Healthcare Standards 2001, National Health Performance Committee 2000, Wolfson et al. 2002, National Health Service 2002).


However, a method for integrating the value of effects in ratio measures of economic efficiency consistent with the maximising of net benefit has not been identified. Rather, economic efficiency measures across such providers have either:

(i) ignored effects of care in efficiency measurement, for example with cost per (case-mix adjusted) admission in hospitals;

(ii) modelled effects as exogenous parameters in efficiency measurement (e.g. Zuckerman et al. 1994), and hence been unable to include their value in estimating economic or allocative efficiency; or

(iii) specified effects as utility bearing outputs in efficiency measurement (Gregan et al. 1997, Puig-Junoy 1998, Dawson et al. 2005), representing,
where identifiable, objectives such as average cost per unit effect (average cost effectiveness).

The objective of this paper is to identify a systematic method for including effects in ratio measures of economic efficiency consistent with maximising net benefit. The paper is structured as follows. A correspondence is identified between

(1) maximising net benefit, and

(2) minimising costs plus effects framed from a disutility perspective valued at the same monetary amount per unit of effect as net benefit.

This correspondence is shown to allow economic efficiency measures consistent with maximising net benefit on the cost-disutility plane. This method is illustrated in comparing relative efficiency of 45 hospitals based on their means cost and mortality rate per admission. The relative merits of the proposed method to previous methods for including effects as quality of service indicators are discussed and consequently conclusions are drawn on the usefulness of the proposed approach.

2. Measuring economic efficiency consistent with an appropriate objective

When comparing service providers such as hospitals, economic performance measures have historically ignored quality of care indicators concentrating on ‘homogenous’ intermediate measures of output such as “case-mix” (relative service cost intensity) adjusted admissions. This concentration on intermediate outputs has been: “largely because measurement problems are less constraining.” (McGuire et al. 1988) p.218.
However, economic performance measures such as cost per case-mix adjusted admission, which include costs of (implicitly), but ignore effects of, quality of services, do not create appropriate incentives for service quality. Effects and costs of services are jointly influenced by quality and hence including the cost but not the value of quality in efficiency measurement will create incentives for cost minimising quality of services. The importance of considering the joint relationship between value and cost of quality in considering efficiency was highlighted by Harris in his paper on the internal organisation of the hospital, split between clinicians with an objective of health maximisation, and administrators with an objective of cost minimisation:

“The failure to recognize that doctors and hospitals are linked by a strong bond of joint production is the basis of many of the hospitals inefficiencies.” (Harris 1977 p.475).

The desirability of taking into account value (of effects) as well as costs of quality of services is reinforced when considering the impact of quality of services on expected costs and effects post service. For example, health systems are characterised by incomplete vertical integration across health services (Evans 1981) and hence quality of hospital care within an admission can have significant impacts beyond post separation on the wider health system. Consequently, if hospitals are not held accountable for the expected effects of their care beyond separation, perverse economic incentives are created for practices such as quicker-sicker care, cost-shifting and quality-skimping (Smith 2002). That is, where hospital performance is measurement with cost per (case-
mix adjusted) admission, providers can improve performance by earlier release of sick patients (quicker-sicker care). However, while such practices can reduce cost per admission, they have expected negative effects on health effects beyond hospital separation (effect or outcome shifting) and consequently increase expected demands for and use of care post-discharge (cost-shifting). Such cost-shifting may manifest in increasing rates of readmission to hospitals, treatment in other institutional settings (general practice, specialist and aged care services), or informal care in non-institutional settings. In generally, accounting for effects over time in efficiency measurement would appear to be necessary to avoid perverse incentives for cost and effect-shifting and create incentives for appropriate quality of services. However, the question remains as to whether such effects can be specified in efficiency measurement to create incentives consistent with an appropriate underlying economic objective.

Health economists have stressed the importance of evaluating strategies relative to a comparator and informing decision makers of incremental rather than average cost–effectiveness ratios (Drummond et al. 1987, Drummond et al. 1997, Drummond et al. 2005). This rejection of average cost effectiveness ratios in favour of incremental cost effectiveness ratios is based on the incremental and non-tradable nature of health effects of care in treated populations (McGuire et al. 1988) p.32 (Eckermann 2004) pp.134-135. However, in service industries more generally effects of services are characteristically incremental and non-tradable once received. Hence, in general effects of services require consideration relative to counterfactual alternatives (even if doing nothing), and unlike goods their value will be specific to the
population receiving them once provided. Consequently, the consideration of incremental rather than average cost effectiveness ratios is suggested to be generally appropriate in service industries given the effects of services are incremental and cannot simply be traded, or their value repeated, once received.

Decision making based on considering incremental health effects relative to the incremental cost of alternative strategies in processes of health technology assessment, were suggested by Claxton and Posnett (1996) as equivalent to maximizing the net value of incremental effects of a technology at a threshold willingness to pay (WTP) for effects minus incremental costs. Stinnett and Mullahy (1998) described this net value of incremental effects less incremental costs for a strategy relative to a comparator as incremental net benefit. Formally, incremental net monetary benefit (INMB) per patient can be represented for a given strategy \( i \), relative to a comparator \( c \), as:

\[
INMB_i = k(E_i - E_c) - (C_i - C_c)
\]  

(1)

where \( k \) represents the threshold willingness to pay per unit of effect, \( E \) is effect per patient, and \( C \) is cost per patient. The maximisation of net benefit has therefore been established in health technology assessment as the appropriate objective underlying public decision making in comparing alternative health care strategies.

More generally, the maximisation of net benefit in equation (1) was shown by Graham (1981,1992) to provide a necessary and sufficient condition to for pareto improvement, ensuring marginal benefit equals marginal cost under uncertainty in cost-benefit analysis. Graham (1992) also established net benefit
criteria, providing necessary and sufficient conditions for pareto efficient public expenditure under uncertainty.

Hence, if efficiency measurement for public services such as health care are to align with pareto improving solutions to public expenditure under uncertainty an objective function for including effects in efficiency measurement of maximising net benefit is suggested. However, historically, methods proposed to include effects of services, (such as mortality, morbidity and readmission) in efficiency measurement have attempted to specify them under the ‘quality-quantity trade-off’ suggested by Newhouse (Newhouse 1970). Methods previously suggested for specifying effects in performance measurement under this trade-off can be broadly characterised as:

(i) **Exogenous methods**: Conditioning of activity-based measures of performance on rates of effects, for example in the study of Zuckermann et al.(1994) conditioning cost per case-mix adjusted admission on whether case-mix-adjusted mortality rate was in the upper or lower decile;

(ii) **Endogenous methods**: Specifying health effects framed from a utility bearing perspective as outputs, for example use of survival in Puig-Junoy (1998) and effects more generally (survival, life years, quality adjusted life years) in Dawson et al. (2005).

Neither of these approaches to specifying health effects in efficiency measures represent the underlying economic objective of maximising net benefit underlying health technology assessment, as demonstrated in Eckermann (2004,
The first set of specifications, conditioning performance on rates of effects, effectively treat effects as exogenously determined environmental variables (outside the control of the hospital), rather than endogenously determined variables representing quality of care. The inability of exogenous specification of effects to represent effects as quality of care indicators was made clear in the study of Zuckermann (1994). Expected costs were adjusted upwards for hospitals that had mortality rates in either the lower or upper decile (lowest or highest quality of care) in comparison to hospitals in the tenth to ninetieth percentile.

Hence, the exogenous treatment of effects resulted in both the highest and lowest quality providers having their performance (expected relative to actual costs at their level of mortality) increased relative to other providers. In general, specifying health effects as exogenous variables prevents their value being included in economic or allocative efficiency measurement. Consequently, an exogenous specification of health effects cannot represent maximisation of net benefit.

The second set of endogenous specifications framing effects from a utility bearing perspective (e.g. survivors, reduction in morbidity, reduction in readmission) and specifying them as outputs in efficiency measurement recognises an interaction between quality and quantity of care. However, even, in the simplest case with one measure of effect, if a value is attached per unit of effect as proposed in Dawson et al (2005), these values cancel in comparing relative performance. Hence the implicit underlying objective with an output
specification of effects from a utility-bearing perspective is at best minimising average cost per unit effect, as demonstrated by Eckermann (Eckermann 2004, Eckermann 2006). For example, if the average cost per survivor between two hospitals is 1.1 then the ratio will remain 1.1 under this output specification, regardless of the value of effects. Endogenous specifications of effects of care framed from a utility-bearing perspective, like endogenous output specifications of effects have problems of invariance to the value attributed to effects of care in comparing performance. Consequently, neither specification of health effects as outputs framed from a utility bearing perspective or exogenous specification of can reflect an objective of maximising net benefit.

3. Measuring economic efficiency consistent with maximizing net benefit

We would like economic efficiency measures across public service such as hospitals to be consistent with maximising net benefit to provide incentives supporting pareto efficiency. However, while the net benefit formulations in equation (1) represents an objective which can appropriately trade off the value of incremental effects and costs of (quality of) care, they do not have radial (ratio) properties required for economic efficiency measurement.

The lack of radial properties in (1) is evident in comparison of strategies on the incremental cost effectiveness plane, where incremental costs and effects can be positive or negative. Consequently with equation (1) there are 4 quadrants for consideration, with performance only unequivocally improving in contracting to a vertex in the quadrant where incremental cost is positive and incremental effect is negative. However, a linear transformation of the net benefit statistic in
equation (1) could permit radial properties, while retaining an underlying objective of maximizing net benefit with a one to one correspondence.

Consider a bilateral comparison between service providers $i$ and $j$, where incremental effect per service for provider $i$ can be expressed by differences in a single rate of effect, which framed from a utility bearing perspective we label $E^u$ (e.g. survival rate). We let $k$ be the associated decision maker’s threshold WTP per unit effect. Without loss of generalization (order is arbitrary in establishing a correspondence), let

$$INMB_i > INMB_j$$

Then from equation (1), when two providers with a common comparator (no difference in expected rate of effects and costs per service) are compared, the comparator terms cancel.

$$\iff k \times E^u_i - C_i > k \times E^u_j - C_j$$

(2)

Now, if we multiply both sides of equation (2) by minus 1, the sign changes and we translate from maximizing net benefit per service to minimizing net loss per service:

$$\iff C_i - k \times E^u_i < C_j - k \times E^u_j$$

(3)

Adding $k$ to both sides of equation (3) and re-arranging with common factors we obtain:

$$\iff C_i + k \times (1 - E^u_i) < C_j + k \times (1 - E^u_j)$$

(4)

Now, if $E^u$ is rate of effect framed from a utility bearing perspective (e.g. survival rate) then $(1 - E^u)$ represents the rate of services framed from a disutility bearing perspective, $E^{DU}$ (e.g. mortality rate).
Therefore, where effects are currently represented by the rate of an event framed from a utility bearing perspective (e.g. survival, absence of morbidity, functional ability), maximising net benefit is equivalent to minimising the sum of costs and effect framed from a disutility perspective (mortality, morbidity, functional limitation) valued at their WTP threshold. The necessary and sufficient conditions required for this relationship to hold are that differences in expected cost and effect are adjusted for (comparator condition) and that effects framed from a disutility perspective cover the effects of care in net benefit framed from a utility bearing perspective (coverage condition).

Now, consider whether this correspondence generalises to multiple effects and differences between providers in expected costs and effects of people receiving services. Let all potential combinations of effects framed from a disutility perspective be represented by \((E_{DU_1}^{DU}, E_{DU_2}^{DU}, \ldots, E_{DU_m}^{DU})\), and associated values of units of effects by \((k_1, \ldots, k_m)\). Then, under the coverage condition of the correspondence theorem, net benefit for any hospital \((i=1, \ldots, n)\) can be presented relative to a comparator representing expected costs and effects as:

\[
\text{INMB}_i = k_i(E_{DU_1}^{DU} - C_i) + \ldots + k_m(E_{DU_m}^{DU} - C_i) - (C_i - C_i)
\]

\[
= (k_i \times E_{DU_1}^{DU} + \ldots + k_m \times E_{DU_m}^{DU} + C_i) - (k_i \times E_{DU_1}^{DU} + \ldots + k_m \times E_{DU_m}^{DU} + C_i)
\]

Without loss of generalization, let \(\text{INMB}_i > \text{INMB}_j\), then from (6) \(\Leftrightarrow\)

\[
-(k_i \times E_{DU_1}^{DU} + \ldots + k_m \times E_{DU_m}^{DU} + C_i) > -(k_i \times E_{DU_1}^{DU} + \ldots + k_m \times E_{DU_m}^{DU} + C_j) + z
\]

Where: \(z = -(k_i \times E_{DU_1}^{DU} + \ldots + k_m \times E_{DU_m}^{DU} + C_i)\)
Multiplying both sides of (7) by minus 1, the sign changes and we translate from
maximizing net benefit to minimizing net loss per admission:

$$\Leftrightarrow k_1 \times E_{i_1}^{DU} + \ldots + k_m \times E_{i_m}^{DU} + C_j < k_1 \times E_{j_1}^{DU} + \ldots + k_m \times E_{j_m}^{DU} + C_j - Z$$  (8)

Now, if absolute differences in expected costs and disutility events are adjusted
for, this is equivalent to adding the term $z$ to the right-hand side of equation (8)
in any bilateral comparison. Hence, provided absolute differences in expected
costs and disutility event rates are adjusted for, a one-to-one correspondence is
maintained between:

(i) maximizing net benefit and

(ii) minimizing the sum of cost and effects framed from a disutility perspective

$(E_{i_1}^{DU}, \ldots, E_{i_m}^{DU})$, valued per unit effect as in net benefit $(k_1, \ldots, k_m)$.

Now, consider whether this correspondence generalises further to cases where
effects are measured by time dependant variable such as life years or quality
adjusted life years in health care. The proof for the case of multiple strategies
established that satisfying the common comparator assumption is equivalent to
adjusting for differences in expected costs and effects (patient risk factors)
across providers. We make use of this result to simplify the proof for cases
where effects are measures by life years or quality adjusted life years.

Let incremental QALYs be represented incremental to the highest observed
QALYS. Further, to satisfy the common comparison condition let $Q$ and
$C$ represents incremental QALYs and cost per patient adjusted for expected
differences in patient risk factors. Then the incremental net monetary benefit of
each provider can be represented by:

$$INMB_i = k \times (Q_i - Q_{i,\text{max}}) - (C_i - C_{i,\text{max}})$$  (10)
Without loss of generalisation, let $INMB_i > INMB_j$

$$\Leftrightarrow k \times (Q_i - Q_{\max}) - (C_i - C_{\max}) > k \times (Q_j - Q_{\max}) - (C_j - C_{\max}) \quad (11)$$

Cancelling common terms and multiplying by minus one.

$$\Leftrightarrow k \times (Q_{\max} - Q_i) + C_i < k \times (Q_{\max} - Q_j) + C_j \quad (12)$$

Now, let $E^{DU}_i$ be life years or quality adjusted life year lost relative to the highest attained.

$$E^{DU}_i = Q_{\max} - Q_i \quad (13)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow k \times E^{DU}_i + C_i < k \times E^{DU}_j + C_j \quad (14)$$

QED

Hence, If the net benefit for services of provider $i$ is greater than that of provider $j$, then the sum of cost per service and effects per service, framed from a disutility perspective and valued per unit effect as in net benefit ($k \times E^{DU}_i + C_i$), are less for $i$, under correspondence conditions of coverage and comparability.

The cases of effects represented by a single event rate, multiple event rates, and time dependent effects such as life years illustrate that this is the case regardless of how effects are measured. This relationship can be formally stated as the net benefit correspondence theorem (Eckermann 2004).

### 3.1 The net-benefit correspondence theorem

There is a one-to-one correspondence between maximising net benefit, and minimising cost plus the value of effects in net benefit framed from a disutility perspective (e.g. mortality, morbidity, functional limitation, life years lost or QALYS lost), where the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Effects framed from disutility perspective cover effects of services (coverage condition);

(ii) Expected differences in costs and disutility are adjusted for (comparison condition).

Figure 1 graphically illustrates the correspondence between maximizing net benefit and minimizing $k \times E^{DU} + C$. In figure 1 a lower rate of $E^{DU}$ (e.g. mortality, morbidity, functional limitation, loss of life years or loss of QALYs) per admission represents increasing quality of care under correspondence conditions. The efficiency frontier (ABC) represents the technically feasible trade-off between cost and $E^{DU}$, which a priori is expected to reflect diminishing returns to resources (costs), as $E^{DU}$ approaches 0 (quality of services increases).

Incremental net benefit is the value of incremental effects less incremental costs relative to a comparator. For providers in figure 1 the value of incremental effects is represented by DE, a line whose slope represents the threshold WTP for effects (k), and is positive for rates of disutility below that of the comparator and negative for rates of disutility above that of the comparator. For providers on the efficiency frontier ABC, incremental costs relative to a common comparator are represented by FGH, a parallel shift down in the vertical plane of this frontier by the cost per service of a common comparator. Therefore, incremental net benefit for providers on the frontier is shown by the curve IJ, equivalent to the value of incremental health effect (DE) conditional on rate of disutility, less incremental cost (FGH). This incremental net benefit curve is
maximised where the marginal cost of reducing disutility (slope of FGH) equates with the marginal value of reducing disutility (slope of DE, k).

Now, the efficiency frontier ABC and incremental cost curve of providers on the frontier FGH have the same slope at the same level of disutility as there is a constant vertical distance between them equivalent to the cost of the comparator. Hence, the quality of care (\(E^{DU}\)) at which net benefit is maximised will correspond to where the efficiency frontier ABC has slope \(-k\), point E in figure 1. At E, level lines of the form cost plus disutility events valued at the decision makers threshold (k) equals a constant, have their value minimised across the feasible set of convex cost-disutility combinations. Hence for providers on the frontier there is a correspondence between maximising incremental net benefit and minimising the sum of cost plus \(E^{DU}\) valued at k per unit of effect.

More generally, differences in net benefit between providers can be measured on the cost-disutility plane under correspondence conditions as distances between level net benefit lines, with providers closer to the origin having higher net benefit. Therefore, a complete ordering across providers consistent with that of maximising net benefit can be established in the cost-disutility plane for any given value of effects, by considering the relative position of such level lines that providers lie on. Distances measured between net benefit lines on the cost axis represent differences in net monetary benefit per admission while distances measured on the disutility axis, \(E^{DU}\), represent differences in net effect benefit.
4. Applying the net benefit correspondence to efficiency measurement

The net benefit correspondence theorem provides a general method for comparing efficiency of providers consistent with an economic objective of maximizing net benefit. The net benefit formulation in equation (1) on the incremental cost effectiveness plane does not permit efficiency measures. However, a linear transformation onto the cost-disutility plane in equation (5) allows efficiency measures consistent with maximising net benefit. Equi-proportionally reducing costs and effects framed from a disutility perspective, $E^{DU}$ increases net benefit. Hence, comparison on the cost-disutility plane allows radial properties and ratio measures of performance consistent with maximising net benefit. Consequently, efficiency measurement methods based on ratio measures such as index or frontier methods can be applied to estimate economic efficiency consistent with maximising net benefit on the cost-disutility plane. Decomposition of economic efficiency consistent with maximising net benefit into scale, technical and allocative efficiency can also be undertaken with frontier methods on the cost-disutility plane, to allow a richer story of sources of inefficiency to be told.

4.1 Decomposition of net benefit efficiency with frontier methods

Figure 1 illustrated that to maximise net benefit in the cost-disutility plane it is necessary to be on the convex efficiency frontier representing minimum cost per service conditional on $E^{DU}$ or, equivalently, minimum $E^{DU}$ conditional on cost. Net benefit is maximised at the point of tangency between a net benefit line closest to the origin (with slope -$k$ representing the value of a unit of effect) and the frontier representing the boundary of feasible convex combinations of
strategies on the cost-disutility plane (at B in figure 1). Therefore, being on the efficiency frontier (technically efficient) is a necessary, while not sufficient, condition for net benefit maximization under correspondence conditions, which additionally depends on the value of effects.

Consequently, reductions in net benefit can be simply decomposed into sources of technical and allocative inefficiency on the cost disutility plane using existing methods based on radial properties, such as data envelopment analysis (DEA). Using DEA, technical inefficiency on the cost disutility plane can be simply be estimated under constant returns to scale (Charnes et al. 1978) as the proportion by which cost and $E^{DU}$ per patient can be reduced to a frontier constructed as a convex piecewise linear hull of observed best practice. Figure 2 illustrates efficiency measurement relative to such a DEA frontier in the cost disutility plane, where all conventional inputs per admission are represented by cost and effects by $E^{DU}$ (e.g. mortality, morbidity, functional limitation, life years lost or quality adjusted life years lost).

For a provider at $P$ in figure 2, technical efficiency of net benefit under constant returns to scale (CRS) is estimated relative to the unit isoquant ($TT'$) minimizing cost and rate of disutility per admission as $OQ/OP$. This estimate of technical efficiency does not depend on the value of effects represented by the rate of disutility. At a decision maker’s value for effects of $k$, economic efficiency can be measured consistent with maximising net benefit, relative to the level net benefit line at the point of tangency to the frontier. For example, for a provider at $P$ in Figure 2, economic (net benefit) efficiency is estimated as $OR/OP$. 
Consequently, allocative efficiency of net benefit (the appropriateness of factor proportions for inputs given decision makers value of effects) can also be estimated as the residual of economic efficiency and technical efficiency under constant returns to scale, equivalent to $OR/OQ$ for a provider at $P$.

Technical efficiency can also be estimated with DEA formulations under variable returns to scale (Banker et al. 1984) and not increasing returns to scale (Färe et al. 1994). Hence, scale efficiency can be estimated as the residual of technical efficiency under VRS and CRS, while comparison of not increasing returns to scale and CRS formulations allow an indication of whether scale inefficiency is attributable to increasing or decreasing returns to scale (Coelli et al. 1998).

4.2 Identification of best practice conditional on value of effects

To maximise net benefit at any given value for effects of care it is necessary for providers to be on the technical efficiency frontier where no equi-proportional reduction in cost and $E^{DU}$ is possible. The regions of threshold WTP for effects of care over which each of these technically efficient hospitals maximise net benefit are simply identified by back-solved between adjacent technically efficient providers with:

$$C_j + k \times DU_j = C_j + k \times DU_j \Leftrightarrow k = (C_j - C_i)/(DU_j - DU_i)$$

(13)

4.3 Implicit industry value of quality (shadow price)

Economic efficiency for each provider compared can be estimated conditional on $k$, the threshold WTP of effects, by simply changing the slope of net benefit
lines in the cost-disutility plane and altering the point of tangency to the frontier in figure 2. Therefore, weighting economic efficiency for each provider by their industry share of costs, an industry economic efficiency can be estimated. Mapping industry economic efficiency against potential values for a unit of effect, the shadow price of effects (quality) of care in industry behaviour can be simply identified as the value that maximizes industry economic (and allocative) efficiency.

5. Illustrating efficiency measurement in the cost-disutility plane

We compare performance of forty-five Australian acute care public hospitals in treating patients for DRG E62a (respiratory infection). This comparison is based on cost and admission data collected by the Australian National Hospital Cost Data Collection (NHCDC) as part of the annual sample used to construct DRG weights (Australian Government Department of Health and Aged Care 2000), and data provided by the New South Wales Health Department on in hospital mortality rate. The cost per admission and mortality rate for these forty-five hospitals in treating patients for DRG E62a are shown in figure 3, with cost per admission on the horizontal axis and mortality rate on the horizontal axis.

Technical inefficiency of providers reflects the degree of radial contraction to the frontier possible, while economic inefficiency reflects the degree of radial contraction to the net benefit level line tangent to the frontier, illustrated at a value of $30,000 per life saved in figure 3. Where the value of effects is uncertain, economic efficiency can be conditioned on potential (plausible)
values for effects of care. In table 1 economic efficiency across the 45 hospitals are reported:

1. with the proposed method at potential WTP thresholds of $0 (corresponding to current methods with an implicit objective of minimizing cost per admission), $10 000, $25 000 and $50 000 per life saved, and;

2. for an alternative output specification of health effects, where economic efficiency measurement is based on minimising cost per survivor.

The alternative specification applies the method suggested by Dawson et al (2005) and Puig-Junoy (1998) for including health effects in efficiency measures as utility bearing outputs, rather than disutility bearing inputs of the proposed method.

Using the proposed method, peers (economic efficiency of 1) and relative ordering of economic efficiency are conditional on the WTP threshold for the effect of survival in table 1. At $0 per life saved (corresponding to minimising cost per admission), hospital 26 is a peer and benchmark with the lowest cost of $3590 per admission, while hospital 33 with a cost per admission of $5283 has economic efficiency of 0.70. However, at $50,000 per life saved, hospital 33 with a 3.3% mortality rate is the peer, while hospital 26 with a 17.0% mortality rate has economic efficiency of 0.58. Differences between the ordering at a value of effects of 0 and that of a decision maker reflects the divergence between minimising cost per admission and maximising net benefit.
Using the alternative method based on utility bearing outputs, economic efficiency minimises cost per survivor (average cost effectiveness in the last column of table 1) and hence is invariant to the value of survival. Regardless of the value of survival, hospital 17 would be identified as economically efficient (cost per survivor of $4258), while hospitals 26 and 33 have economic efficiency of 0.98 (cost per survivor of $4325) and 0.78 (cost per survivor of $5463), respectively. Hence, an output specification of effects framed from a utility-bearing perspective does not enable the value of health effects in estimating economic efficiency and consequently cannot be consistent with maximising net benefit, unlike the proposed method.

Having empirically illustrated the advantages of the proposed method in representing economic efficiency, we now empirically consider its decomposition. Table 2 presents technical efficiency under constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS), scale efficiency as the residual of CRS divided by VRS, and an indicator of whether scale inefficiency is attributable to increasing or decreasing returns to scale for the 45 compared hospitals. Hospitals 26, 17 and 33 are technically efficient under constant returns to scale, reflecting those hospitals on the frontier in figure 3. Their cost and mortality per admission cannot be equi-proportionally reduced in comparison with convex combinations of all other hospitals. Technically efficiency calculated under a variable returns to scale formulation of DEA, has a more restrictive comparison of peers. This is reflected in fourteen of the hospitals identified as technically efficient under a variable returns to scale DEA formulation.
Applying the back solving formulae in equation 13, technically efficient hospitals 26, 17 and 33 are economically efficient for value per additional survivor of $0 to $3523, $3524 to $24356 and greater than $24356, respectively.

Figure 3 illustrates industry cost share weighted economic efficiency is maximised at $3523 per life saved, indicating the industry shadow price across hospitals for quality of care. This shadow price suggests industry behaviour across hospitals is reflecting an economic incentive for cost minimising quality of care under case-mix funding, rather than the objective of net benefit maximisation implicit in processes of health technology assessment.

In summary, applying the proposed correspondence method to compare hospital efficiency on the cost-disutility plane has been illustrated to, unlike alternative methods, allow:

(i) economic efficiency consistent with maximising net benefit and its decomposition into technical, allocative and scale efficiency;
(ii) values for health effects over which providers are peers; and
(iii) the shadow price of health effects (quality of care) in industry behaviour.

However, in applying the net benefit correspondence theorem in our case example, assumptions were made in each case that comparability and coverage conditions were satisfied. These assumptions would also implicitly be made with application of other methods, but are explicit in applying the net benefit correspondence theorem underlying the proposed method. Comparability and
coverage conditions are clearly not met with the cost and mortality data used in comparing the forty-five Australian hospitals for DRG E62a, as they were not adjusted for differences in patient risk across hospitals and did not allow for cost and health effects beyond point of discharge or non-survival effects within admission. This raises complementary questions of:

1. What are the requirements to robustly satisfy coverage and comparability conditions?

2. What are the implications where these requirements are not satisfied?

5.1 Efficiency measurement where coverage and comparability conditions are not met

To apply the net benefit correspondence theorem to efficiency measurement without qualification requires coverage and comparability conditions are met in practice. However, satisfying coverage and correspondence conditions are also necessary and sufficient to prevent incentives for cost-shifting and cream-skimming respectively, and would be required to prevent these incentives whatever method were applied. To illustrate why this is the case, consider what is required to avoid cream-skimming and cost-shifting being measured as performance improvement, and hence perverse incentives for these activities being created by performance measures.

Incentives to choose patients with lower expected costs and higher expected effects (cream-skim) will be created by performance measures unless differences in the expected cost and effects of care (patient risk factors), at point of admission, are adjusted for. Adjustment of costs and effects for patient risk
factors at point of admission are also required to satisfy the common comparison condition. Therefore, adjusting rates of costs and effects per admission across compared providers for predictive patient risk factors satisfies the common comparator condition and prevent incentives for cream-skimming. However, if risk adjustment of costs and effects is not undertaken, as in the illustrated comparison across forty-five hospitals, the common comparison condition is not satisfied and relative performance measures include, and hence create incentives for, cream-skimming. Hence, satisfying the common comparator condition is necessary and sufficient to prevent cream-skimming being measured as improved performance, and prevent incentives being created by performance measures for cream-skimming.

Similarly, in considering the coverage condition, incentives are created for cost-shifting and health outcome-shifting with hospital economic efficiency measurement unless costs and health effects beyond separation are adjusted for in performance measurement. However, adjusting for these effects beyond point of separation are also required to satisfy the coverage condition of the net benefit correspondence theorem. In our hospital example, adjustment of within admission mortality rates and costs per patient to a common time point with data linkage or modelling expected effects conditioning on expected health state at point of separation would be required to satisfy the coverage condition and prevent incentives for cost, and outcome, shifting. In the absence of adjustment for actual or expected costs and mortality beyond point of separation, relative performance measurement should be qualified as incorporating and hence creating incentives for, cost and outcome, shifting. Hence, satisfying the
coverage condition is necessary and sufficient to prevent incentives for cost, and outcome, shifting.

In summary, efficiency measurement should be qualified as reflecting and creating incentives for cost, and outcome, shifting and cream-skimming to the extent that correspondence conditions of coverage and comparability are respectively not met. The lack of risk adjustment or data linkage in the illustrated example clearly qualifies efficiency measurement as including and creating incentives for cream-skimming and cost, and mortality, shifting. However, these qualifications would be present given the available cost and mortality data and should be identified whatever efficiency measurement method was employed.

Hence, while application of the net benefit correspondence theorem does not overcome cream-skimming and cost-, and outcome-, shifting incentives, comparability and coverage conditions create an explicit and systematic framework to account for them, a framework absent with alternative methods. Consequently, the net benefit correspondence theorem creates a framework to appropriately account for cream-skimming and cost-shifting in addition to allowing economic efficiency measurement consistent with maximising net benefit, unlike alternative methods.
6. Discussion

Newhouse, when critiquing the use of frontier methods to estimate efficiency of hospitals (such as that of Zuckerman, Hadley and Lezzioni, 1994), raised concerns about their ability to adequately model quality of care (Newhouse 1994). Implicitly, this concerns relate to questions of the appropriateness of the underlying objective function that efficiency measures represent. Applying this criteria we compare the specification of effects as quality of care variables under the proposed method specifying effects as strongly disposable inputs framed from a disutility perspective with previously suggested methods specifying effects as:

(i)  exogenous variables;

(ii) strongly disposable outputs framed from a utility bearing perspective and;

(iii) weakly disposable outputs framed from a disutility bearing perspective.

In this paper specification of health effects as endogenous inputs framed from a disutility perspective has been demonstrated to allow:

1. identification of peers and estimation of economic and allocative as well as technical efficiency consistent with maximising net benefit and;

2. estimation of a monetary shadow price of quality in the absence of prices for services per se.

In contrast, specification of effects as exogenous variables (i) or utility bearing outputs (ii) have been shown to not allow the value of effects to be included in
efficiency measurement and hence fail to allow for effects of care as quality indicators in identification of peers or measures of economic efficiency and consequently allocative efficiency. Further, a monetary shadow prices for effects as a quality of care variable cannot be estimated with (i) or (ii).

An alternative specification of effects such as pollution or other negative externalities in efficiency measurement have previously been proposed in estimating technical efficiency measure under the hyperbolic method of Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell and Parsuka (Färe et al. 1989). This hyperbolic method measures technical efficiency in equi-proportionally contracting ‘weakly disposable undesirable outputs’ and expanding ‘strongly desirable outputs’. However, the assumption of weakly disposable undesirable outputs under this hyperbolic method is unable to reflect the value of effects framed from a disutility perspective in an economic efficiency measure, effectively treating effects of care as exogenously determined. Figure 4 illustrates technical efficiency measured under the hyperbolic method relative to an efficiency frontier OABCD. Providers at A, B, C and D are on the frontier with technical efficiency of 1 as they cannot equi-proportionally expand strongly disposable desirable outputs (v, e.g. electricity), and contracting weakly disposable undesirable outputs (w, e.g. pollution). Providers interior to (south east of) OABCD who can equi-proportionally expand desirable output and contract undesirable output have technical efficiency less than one, $1/\lambda$ in the case of the provider at E.
However, technical efficiency estimated relative to regions of the frontier such as CD in figure 4, becomes meaningless as a performance measurement where disutility event reflect quality of service, rather than differences in external influences. This is particularly problematic, as output-orientated economic efficiency can not be estimated in the absence of prices for desirable relative to undesirable outputs, and hence technical efficiency measurement effectively becomes the only measure of relative performance.

Hence, the proposed method of specifying effects as inputs framed from a disutility perspective is simpler than the hyperbolic method of Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell and Parsuka (Färe et al. 1989) and allows estimation of economic efficiency and meaningful estimation of technical efficiency for all providers.

The proposed method with effects specified as inputs also enables the estimation of a shadow price for effects or quality of care indicators relative to costs, with the output of number of services appropriately treated as a scalar. In contrast the related method of Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell and Yaisawarang (Färe et al. 1993) for estimating a monetary shadow price of ‘undesirable outputs’ under the hyperbolic specification or indeed any output specification of effects, cannot be employed in the absence of monetary prices for services per se (e.g. monetary value of an admission in a public hospital). However, monetary valuation of services is in general prevented with quality differentiated services by the inability to separate service volume from the value of service quality.
In summary there are distinct advantages to hospital efficiency comparison from specifying effects framed from a disutility perspective as inputs over alternatively proposed utility bearing output, exogenous or hyperbolic disutility bearing weakly disposable output specifications. Previous studies in environmental economics have also applied and noted the appropriateness of specifying undesirable products such as pollution as inputs in estimating technical efficiency. Pittman (Pittman 1981), Cropper and Oates (Cropper et al. 1992), Haynes et al (Haynes et al. 1993, Haynes et al. 1994) and Rheinhardt, Lovell and Thjissen (Reinhard et al. 1999) have all included undesirable by-products such as pollutants and waste as inputs in technical efficiency measurement. As Pittman (1981) and Reinhardt et al. (1999) suggest, the relationship between a negative variable and an output looks like the relationship between conventional input and output. However, these studies did not consider economic or allocative efficiency, where the method outlined in this paper provides the theoretical support for specifying effects from a disutility perspective as inputs to represent value of effects in efficiency measurement consistent with maximising net benefit. While this has been illustrated in comparing hospitals in this paper, the proposed method is general and can equally be applied to measure efficiency allowing for effects consistent with maximising net benefit wherever the valuing of effects and objective of maximising net benefit is appropriate. Natural applications are suggested in service industries such as education, corrective services with effect measures such as unemployment and recidivism but also industries with external effects, such as pollution in energy generation (Eckermann 2004 pp. 274-278).
In addition to advantages related to representing a more appropriate objective in specifying effects, the coverage and comparison conditions of the net benefit correspondence theorem also provide an explicit theoretical framework to account for cost-shifting and cream-skimming. Performance measures should be qualified when these conditions are not satisfied, regardless of which efficiency measures are employed. To satisfy correspondence conditions and avoid incentives for cream-skimming and cost and event shifting, a three stage approach is suggested:

1. Identify the effects of services using decision-analytic methods (as in health technology assessment).

2. Measure effects of services identified in stage 1 in their natural unit, allowing for costs and effects beyond service either with data linkage, or modelling expected effects conditional on surrogates, such as health state at point of discharge in the case of hospitals.

3. Standardise providers’ effects (cost and effects) for differences in baseline population risk factors across providers.

The resulting standardised measures (costs and effects) can then be robustly applied in efficiency measurement. The first two steps are aimed at satisfying the coverage condition and preventing incentives for cost and effect shifting, while the third step is required to prevent incentives for cream skimming and satisfy the comparison condition.

In applying the net benefit correspondence theorem standardised rates of effects across providers produced in the three step process suggested above may need to be reframed from a disutility perspective. In the case of health care many effects
are naturally measured from a disutility perspective, whether as rates of mortality, morbidity, functional limitation or readmission. However, where they are naturally measured from a utility bearing perspective they can be simply reframed from a disutility perspective. Utility translates to disutility, incremental life years to incremental life years lost and incremental quality adjusted life years (QALYs) gained to incremental QALYs lost. In general, framing effects from a disutility perspective can always be undertaken regardless of how effects have been measured from a utility bearing perspective, as demonstrated in the correspondence theorem proof.

7. Conclusion

The maximisation of net benefit has previously been established as an appropriate, pareto improving, economic objective wherever value of effects are important considerations (Graham 1981, 1992). However, current methods for specifying effects in comparing economic efficiency of service providers, such as hospitals, in practice do not represent an underlying objective of maximising net benefit. The objective of this paper was to identify a systematic method for comparing economic efficiency of providers in practice consistent with maximising net benefit. The paper has made two main contributions with respect to this objective.

First, a correspondence method has been identified for specifying effects in ratio measures of performance, consistent with maximising net benefit. An input specification of effects framed from a disutility perspective has been illustrated to, unlike alternative specifications, allow:
1. estimation of economic efficiency, its decomposition into technical, scale and allocative efficiency and peer identification consistent with maximising net benefit and;

2. estimation of the shadow price for quality of care, in the absence of prices for services *per se, such as admissions in hospital.*

Second, coverage and comparability conditions of the net benefit correspondence theorem underlying the proposed method have been shown to provide an explicit framework to account for cost-shifting, and cream-skimming in performance measurement. Satisfying the coverage and common comparison conditions are necessary and sufficient to prevent performance measures creating incentives for cost-shifting and cream-skimming, respectively. Therefore, while coverage and correspondence conditions are explicit in applying the net benefit correspondence theorem to relative performance measurement, they are also implicit in accounting for cost-shifting and cream skimming with alternative methods. Whatever performance measurement framework is applied, performance measures should be qualified where these conditions are not satisfied, and more generally they support risk adjustment and data linkage to prevent cost-shifting and cream-skimming incentives.

In conclusion, the approach outlined in this paper links the advantages of an appropriate economic objective function in maximising net benefit with radial properties of efficiency measurement to allow a story in explaining sources of inefficiency. The correspondence theorem underlying this method offers a
framework to avoid incentives for cream-skimming and cost-, and effect-
shifting while creating incentives for net benefit maximising quality of care.

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Aberdeen and Newcastle in 2003 and 2004, as well as related papers presented
at conferences in 2003 and 2005 for the International Health Economic
Association (IHEA), in 2005 for Medical Decision Making (MDM) and in 2006
for Health Technology Assessment International (HTAI) and the International
Conference on Health and Social Care Modelling and Applications (HSCM).
References


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Table 2: Technical efficiency of net benefit minimising cost and disutility event per admission under constant, variable and non-increasing returns to scale and scale efficiency

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* scale inefficiency due to increasing returns to scale (IRS) or decreasing returns to scale (DRS)
**Figure 1:** Correspondence between maximising net benefit and minimising the sum of costs plus disutility events valued as in net benefit (k)
Figure 2: Decomposing net benefit efficiency into technical efficiency of net benefit (minimising cost per service $E_{DU}$) and allocative efficiency

Cost /service ($S$)

technical efficiency of provider at $P=OQ/OP$
with value of effects $k$:

economic efficiency for provider at $P=OR/OP$
allocative efficiency for provider at $P=OR/OQ$
**Figure 3:** Applying the correspondence theorem to efficiency measurement across 45 Australian public hospitals for DRG E62a

![Graph showing the correspondence between mortality rate and net benefit level line, with annotations for 45 hospitals, technical efficiency frontier, and net benefit level line with k=$30000 per life saved.](image-url)
Figure 4 Technical efficiency under the hyperbolic method with undesirable events as a weakly disposable output